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Paul B. Stephan*
ABSTRACT

This Article examines the basis of an asserted jus cogens
exception to sovereign immunity. It demonstrates that the vision
of jus cogens one embraces depends on background assumptions
about the present and future of the internationalsystem. A robust
conception of jus cogens assumes: (1) that independent judges
and tribunals, informed by the views of non-state actors, can
identify core international obligations and manage their
tradeoffs with other values pursued by the internationallegal
system, and (2) that the actions of independent judges and
tribunals, informed by non-state actors, will influence state
behavior. Doubts about the abilities of judges and tribunals, or
fear about the rise of powerful and authoritarianactors in the
international system, leads to a much narrower role for jus
cogens, and thus broadersovereign immunity.
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A deep tension exists between sovereign immunity and the
contemporary jus cogens doctrine. On the one hand, all states
recognize that subjecting a foreign sovereign to another state's legal
process, in the absence of consent, flies in the face of an international
system based on sovereign independence. In an earlier era it was a
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lawful cause for war.' On the other hand, since World War II there
has grown an idea that violations of human rights cannot go
unpunished. In the last two decades, abhorrence of impunity has
migrated to the concept of jus cogens, the idea that certain norms of
international law are so compelling that sovereign immunity falls
away. The jus cogens concept does double duty: it both legitimizes an
exercise of judicial power that would otherwise violate the settled
norms of international law, and forbids sovereigns from immunizing
conduct that transgresses a jus cogens norm.
The present dispute between Germany and Italy before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) presents both aspects of the
doctrine. The Italian Corte Suprema di Cassazione justified the
exercise of Italian judicial jurisdiction over the German state on the
basis of the nature of misdeeds for which Germany was responsible.
Before the ICJ, Italy also argued that a treaty purporting to settle all
claims against Germany arising out of World War II atrocities had no
legal effect, again because of the nature of the injuries suffered. The
case thus invites a fuller consideration of the origins and functions of
the jus cogens concept as a limit on both sovereign immunity and
sovereign power. Regardless of how the ICJ ultimately disposes of the
matter, what might domestic legal actors-in particular courts-take
away from the case?
This Article will not advise policymakers how to resolve the
obvious conflict between immunity and jus cogens. Indeed, part of its
argument is that persons seized with lawmaking authority (domestic
and international courts as well as legislators and foreign offices)
should not put too much weight on the opinions of legal scholars, this
one included. Rather, it will demonstrate that arguments about jus
cogens are ultimately about power, and that strong jus cogens claims
have complicated consequences. What works in one group of
states (liberal democracies with strong civil societies and independent
judiciaries) doesn't work with another (authoritarian states with the
resources to resist international pressure).
Among liberal democracies, jus cogens arguments empower
of
and advisers
employees
particular groups-academics,
international organizations, and national and international
judges-at the expense of national officials and legislators. As to these
states, expanding and strengthening jus cogens advances the
privatization of international law. 2 Between authoritarian regimes
and liberal democracies, broadening jus cogens may mean limiting the
constraining effect of international law. Clarifying the stakes in these

1.
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 144 (1812);
Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009).
See Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV.
2.

(forthcoming Nov. 2011).
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arguments does not drive one toward any particular conclusion, but
does illuminate the consequences of particular choices. Thus, this
Article serves as an exercise in transparency in legal decision making,
not as apologia for any particular outcome.
The Article begins with a description of the jus cogens arguments
made by both the Corte Suprema di Cassazione and Italy and

considers their logical implications. It then sketches the development
of the jus cogens concept in public international law. It notes the
analogy that early advocates made with the eponymous civil law
doctrine. Next, it explores the polarized debate that unfolded during
the Cold War, followed by the human rights paradigm that
transformed jus cogens over the last two decades. The Article relates
these developments to larger transformations in international
relations and the corresponding international law structures. It then
considers the implications for the distribution of power that variants of
jus cogens imply. Finally, the Article discusses the role of non-state
actors in the articulation of international law and the appropriate use
of their claims by domestic courts and international tribunals. It also
notes the complexities that may arise when some states in the
international system assign responsible roles to independent judges
and jurists and others do not.
This Article demonstrates that the vision of jus cogens one
embraces depends on background assumptions about the present and
future of the international system. A robust conception of jus cogens
assumes: (1) that independent judges and tribunals, informed by the
views of non-state actors, can identify core international obligations
and manage their tradeoffs with other values pursued by the
international legal system, and (2) that the actions of independent
judges and tribunals, informed by non-state actors, will influence state
behavior. Doubts about the abilities of judges and tribunals, or fear
about the rise of powerful and authoritarian actors in the
international system, will lead one to assign a much narrower role to
jus cogens.

I. JUS COGENS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
The story begins with a late effort to revisit the atrocities
committed by German military and security forces in Italy in the latter
part of World War II. A victim of deportation and forced labor brought
suit in an Italian civil court against the German Federal Republic, the
legal successor to the German Reich, for compensation. A
first-instance court dismissed the case because Italian courts, in the
absence of an applicable statute, apply the customary international
law of sovereign immunity, which recognizes no exceptions for state
acts that violate international law. The Corte Suprema di Cassazione
reversed this decision. It ruled that custom had evolved so as to
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recognize an exception to immunity in cases involving grave violations
of that portion of customary international law that has attained the
status of jus cogens. Accordingly, it allowed the case to proceed.3
Once Italian courts sought to enforce their judgments against
German property in Italy, Germany called on the ICJ to intervene. 4
The jurisdiction of the ICJ rests on a 1957 Convention encompassing
any dispute among the signatory European states.5 Italy, while not
contesting the ICJ's jurisdiction, sought to bring a counterclaim for
compensation from Germany for its war crimes. The ICJ rejected this
move.6 The remainder of the case remains sub judice.
The ICJ's disposition of the counterclaim, the only substantive
ruling in the dispute to date, suggests some skepticism about one
possible use of the jus cogens concept. Most of the members of the
Court regarded Italy's counterclaim as governed by the Peace Treaty
of 1947, which contains a provision waiving claims that Italy and
Italian nationals might bring against Germany. 7 All but one of the

3.
Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, Cass., sez. un., 11 marzo 2004, n.
5044, Giust. Civ. 2004 II, 1191 (It.), reprinted in 87 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE
539 (2004), summarized in Andrea Bianchi, Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, 99
Am. J. INT'L L. 242 (2005). German courts have rejected this reasoning and refuse to
enforce foreign judgments based on it. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of
Justice] 2003 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ]
155 (Ger.), summarized in Sabine Pittrof, Compensation Claims for Human Rights
Breaches Committed by German Armed Forces Abroad During the Second World War:
Federal Court of Justice Hands Down Decision in the Distomo Case, 5 GERMAN L.J. 15
(2004). Before the Ferrini litigation, a Greek court had held that Germany would be
presumed to have waived sovereign immunity in cases resting on a jus cogens violation.
Prefecture of Voiotia v. Germany, Areios Pagos [A.P] [Supreme Court] 11/2000 p. 2
(Greece), summarized in Maria Gavouneli & Ilias Bantekas, Sovereign Immunity-Tort
Reparations-International
Violations-World War II
Exception-Jus Cogens
HumanitarianLaw, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 198 (2001). Two years later a higher Greek
tribunal denounced this decision. Germany v. Margellos, Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio
[A.E.D] [Special Supreme Court] 6/2002 (Greece), translated in 129 I.L.R. 525 (2002),
summarized in Maria Panezi, Sovereign Immunity and Violation of Jus Cogens Norms,
56 REVUE HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 199 (2003). For scholarly criticism of
the Italian position, see generally EYAL BENVENISTI, STANDARD SETTING BY THE BACK
DOOR: ASSESSING SOFT LAw CHALLENGES TO GOVERNMENTS' DISCRETION TO SETTLE
CLAIMS FOR REPARATIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
(2010); Rudolf Dolzer, The Settlement of War-Related Claims: Does InternationalLaw
Recognize a Victim's Private Right of Action? Lessons After 1945, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
296 (2002).
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Application Instituting
4.
Proceedings, at 44 (Dec. 23, 2008), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?
pl=3&k=60&case=143&code=ai&p3=0.
5.
European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes art. 1, Apr. 29,
1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 4646.
6.
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Order, 1 35 (July 6,
2010), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16027.pdf.
7.
Treaty of Peace with Italy art. 77(4), Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1245. As
Germany was not a party to this treaty, there exists a question whether it has standing
to hold Italy to this obligation. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) could not
address this question, however, without exceeding its jurisdiction. See infra note 8.

2011/1

THE POLITICAL ECONOMYOFJUs COGENS

1077

judges concluded that the 1957 Convention, on which the ICJ's
jurisdiction rested, barred any consideration of the legal interests
determined by the Peace Treaty. 8 Judge Cangado Trindade, in
dissent, asserted that "any purported waiver by a State of the rights
inherent to the human person would, in my understanding, be against
the international ordre public, and would be deprived of any juridical
effects."9 For him, the waiver contained in the 1947 Treaty could not
bar Italy's claim, regardless of whether the ICJ had jurisdiction to
apply or interpret that instrument.
Here, in a nutshell, one can find three distinct visions of the jus
cogens concept. The first, more traditional vision of jus cogens is as a
shield. It sets a limit on international law by discarding obligations
that violate a nonnegotiable norm. By diminishing the scope of
international law, it necessarily increases the power a state has to
select among an array of possible choices as to its domestic legal
order. 1o It asserts that any international obligation purporting to
violate jus cogens norms has no legal effect, and thus restricts a state's
power to enter into enforceable international agreements that might
expand the scope of international law. Similarly, it negates customary
international legal obligations to which a state might accede, if those
obligations transgress a jus cogens norm. One can draw an analogy to
a constitutional rule in domestic law, which invalidates otherwise
lawful state acts, thus restricting state power and correspondingly
expanding individual liberty. By limiting the range of international
obligations that a state can assume, the shield vision of jus cogens
similarly expands the liberty of states.
In the case before the ICJ, Germany contends that customary
international law imposes a general obligation on all states not to
subject foreign states to domestic judicial process, at least when the
suit challenges the public acts (acta jure imperii) of the defendant
state. Italy maintains that this general obligation has an exception
when the public act constitutes a violation of a jus cogens norm." The
8.
The ICJ's jurisdiction over Germany's claim rests on Article 27(a) of the
European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, supra note 5, which
accedes to ICJ settlement of disputes between its parties. Article 27(a) excludes from
this jurisdiction "disputes relating to facts and situations" that preexisted the
Convention. Id. For the majority, Italy's counterclaim implicated the 1947 Treaty, a
"situation" that fell within the Article 27(a) exclusion. Jurisdictional Immunities of the
State (Ger. v. It.), Order, supra note 6, 30.
9.
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Order, supra note 6,
124 (Trindade, J., dissenting).
10.
In Hohfeldian terms, the shield conception of jus cogens creates privileges in
favor of a state, and non-rights on the part of the international order. Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16, 32-44 (1913). According to the shield variant, states enjoy the privilege of
transgressing an obligation that violates jus cogens as they choose. Correspondingly, the
international order has no right to require the state to adhere to the obligation.
11.
The case does not involve the question of whether, as a matter of customary
international law, a lawsuit against a state for private acts (actajure gestionis) violates
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ICJ must decide whether Italy violated international law by asserting

jurisdiction over Germany under these circumstances. If Italy
prevails, it will be because jus cogens gives it a privilege to disregard (a
shield from) a duty otherwise imposed by international law, namely
the obligation to respect a state's immunity from judicial process.
A slight variant on the shield vision of jus cogens transforms a flat
prescriptive rule (international custom permits an exception from the
customary law of sovereign immunity in cases involving violations of
jus cogens norms) into an interpretive mechanism. Some jurists have
sought to blend together the widely accepted principle that a sovereign
may waive its immunity and the jus cogens concept. They assert that,
when a violation of ajus cogens rule is alleged, a court should assume a
waiver of immunity.12 However, as states normally do not focus on jus
cogens issues when addressing sovereign immunity, this move in effect
collapses into the shield vision.13
The second vision of jus cogens is as a sword. The international
order insists that states bear certain duties by their very nature of
existing in an international system, independent of any manifestation
of assent to the obligation. The international order has a
corresponding right to enforce the specified duty against states.
Agents of the international order-other states, international
tribunals, and domestic courts-have the power to invoke this right
against the transgressing state, which is liable for its transgression.
These agents wield the sword of jus cogens against the violating
state.14
Contemporary human rights advocates find the sword conception
of jus cogens especially attractive. They believe that jus cogens does
impose a duty on all states to respect certain human rights and

customary international law. Given the widespread, but by no means universal,
adoption of the restrictive view of foreign sovereign immunity, it seems highly unlikely
that any international tribunal would regard a withholding of sovereign immunity with
regard to private acts as a violation of an international obligation.
12.
Areios Pagos [A.P.] [Supreme Court] 11/2000, p. 2 (Greece); cf. Enahoro v.
Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 893 (7th Cir. 2005) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (asserting that
"officials receive no immunity for acts that violate international jus cogens human rights
norms"); Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(Wald, J., dissenting) (asserting that German wartime atrocities violated jus cogens
norms, which constituted an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity).
13.
As a matter of logic, the move constitutes a thaumatrope.See Leon S. Lipson,
The Allegheny College Case, YALE L. REP., Spring 1989, at 8, 11. The principle that
sovereigns may waive their immunity from judicial process in another nation's courts is
well established. In suits alleging violations of a jus cogens norm, however, the facts
rarely, if ever, support the claim that an actual waiver arose. In these suits, the facts
alleged support a strong intuitive sense of a need for reparation, but the existing law of
sovereign immunity provides a powerful obstacle. The move spins together the strong
legal argument of waiver with the strongly appealing fact of an injury to combine
together two elements that, absent the move, belong apart.
14.
On the juxtaposition of duties and rights, see for example Hohfeld, supra
note 10, at 29-32 (defining a right as the opposite of a duty). On powers and liability, see
id. at 44-54 (describing a legal power as the opposite of a legal disability).
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empowers a wide range of persons to enforce those rights on behalf of
the international order. In addition, they believe that jus cogens norms
impose a secondary duty on states to assist those agents of the
international order that have a right to seek reparations for jus cogens
violations. Specifically, the sword conception would require all states
to provide a forum for claims based on jus cogens violations, regardless
of impediments in municipal law or countervailing international legal
principles.' 5 The European Court of Human Rights has considered
this argument but so far has rejected it. 16 The ICJ does not have to
decide this question, as Italy needs to show only that it is free to
disregard Germany's sovereign immunity, not that it is obliged to do
so. In theory, however, the ICJ could assert that Italy has not only the
power to submit Germany to its process, but the duty to do so.
The third, and in some ways the most ambitious, vision of jus
cogens is as a bootstrap. It maintains that the level of international
law protection of jus cogens is so strong that general rules regarding
the limits of an international tribunal's jurisdiction no longer apply.
Just as states bear a duty under the sword vision to enforce jus cogens
duties against states, international tribunals have a corresponding
duty of enforcement on behalf of agents of the international order.
According to this vision, the background norm of international
adjudication (the tribunal may address only those matters that the
parties have submitted to it) contains an exception when one party
1
invokes a right of enforcement based on jus cogens. "
In the ICJ dispute, even Italy did not appear to make such a bold
claim. Rather, it seems to have argued that the 1957 Convention on
which the ICJ's jurisdiction rests effected an implicit modification of
the 1947 Treaty of Peace. The ICJ could determine whether the

See Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga
15.
Omnes, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 65-66 (1996) ("[T[he characterization of certain
crimes asjus cogens places upon states the obligatio erga omnes not to grant impunity to
violators of such crimes.").
See Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, paras. 54-56
16.
(rejecting the argument that European Convention on Human Rights required the
United Kingdom to afford a forum to consider Kuwait's liability for acts of torture). In
material part, the majority said:
Notwithstanding the special character of the prohibition of torture in
international law, the Court is unable to discern in the international
instruments, judicial authorities or other materials before it any firm basis for
concluding that, as a matter of international law, a State no longer enjoys
immunity from civil suit in the courts of another State where acts of torture are
alleged.
Id. para. 61. Eight judges dissented from this decision. New challenges to UK law are
now before that court. See Intervenor Brief by Redress, Amnesty International &
Interights & Justice at 1, Joined Cases, Jones v. United Kingdom, App. No. 34356/06 &
40527/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010).
See Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 66 (arguing that jus cogens norms imply
17.
"universality of jurisdiction").
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Convention reserved a right for Italy to seek reparations against
Germany forjus cogens violations without considering what the Treaty
of Peace had done.' 8 There is some ambiguity in Judge Cangado
Trindade's opinion quoted above, but he seems to support both the
argument Italy appears to have made and the even stronger claim that
normal jurisdictional rules do not apply once jus cogens enters the
picture.
There is, one should note, nothing crazy about the position that
jus cogens trumps conventional limits on an international tribunal's
jurisdiction. The principle that an international tribunal has the
power to decide only claims that states have submitted to it itself rests
on customary international law, including the customary rules of
treaty interpretation. If jus cogens has such force of gravity as to bend
other customary rules, such as the principle of sovereign immunity,
then there exists no a priori reason why it can't bend those relating to
the jurisdiction of tribunals. Put differently, if individual states, as
agents of the international order, have a right to seek reparations
against a state that violates its jus cogens duties, then they could be
understood as conveying this right to international tribunals at the
time they constitute them.' 9
Jus cogens norms, then, can be seen as doing powerful work in
international law. But what, exactly, are these norms? Where did this
powerful doctrinal trump come from, and who wishes to see the card
played? The next section takes up these questions.

18.
The ICJ does not release to the public the memorials submitted by the
parties until after it has concluded a case, so we must infer what Italy argued from what
the ICJ's order says.
19.
For elaboration of this argument, see Bassiouni, supranote 15, at 65-66 ("To
this writer, the implications of jus cogens are those of a duty and not of optional rights;
otherwise jus cogens would not constitute a peremptory norm of international law.
Consequently, these obligations are non-derogable in times of war as well as peace.
Thus, recognizing certain international crimes as jus cogens carries with it the duty to
prosecute or extradite, the non-applicability of statutes of limitation for such crimes, and
universality of jurisdiction over such crimes irrespective of where they were committed,
by whom (including Heads of State), against what category of victims, and irrespective
of the context of their occurrence (peace or war)."). One might draw an analogy from the
so far unresolved debate in U.S. constitutional law over the capacity of Congress to
deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction over particular constitutional disputes. See,
e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Herbert Wechsler, The
Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). Henry Hart argued
that the constitutional power of Congress to limit federal court jurisdiction is subject to
constitutional constraints that courts may adjudicate. One can similarly read Judge
Cangado Trindade as asserting that the ICJ can adjudicate limits on its jurisdiction that
would transgress jus cogens. See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.),
Order, supra note 6, 124 (Trindade, J., dissenting).
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II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE JUS COGENS CONCEPT
The jus cogens concept serves as an example of the "instant
custom" that has dotted the postwar international law landscape. 20
The term itself best translates as "compulsory law." It appears first to
have found its way into American legal discourse by way of reference
to German private law. 21 There it denotes the well understood concept
that rules of public law, i.e., expressions of the ordre public, have
priority over rules of private law. Common lawyers, for example,
accept that contracts in violation of public policy are void. 22 Civil
lawyers tend to replace the protean concept of public policy with a
distinction between public and private law, but the effect is essentially
the same. It means that private ordering must give way to duly
enacted public law.
Within international law, however, the term did not gain much
traction until the postwar era.23 In the immediate aftermath of World
War II, scholars began to try on the concept as a means of grappling
with the German Reich's enormities. The Reich tended to formalize its
acts of aggression, territorial appropriation, mass murder, and other
atrocities through legal instruments, thus highlighting the gap
between legality and morality. Out of revulsion, theorists looked for
ways to construct moral qualifications for international law. 24 Thus,

20.
See, e.g., Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant"
International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23 (1965) ("In that way a treaty
clause can give birth to 'instant custom'-or so says the theory of quasi-universal
treaties: instruments embodying rules that, simply because they have been accepted
qua conventional by a largely binding qua customary on the others."); Prosper Weil,
Towards Relative Normativity in InternationalLaw?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 435 (1983).
For my earlier discussion of the evolution of the jus cogens concept in international law,
see Paul B. Stephan, Symmetry and Selectivity: What Happens in International Law
When the World Changes, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 91, 105-06 (2009) (documenting divergence
in international practice regarding jus cogens).
21.
Ernest G. Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration-Internationaland Interstate
Aspects, 43 YALE L.J. 716, 727 n.34 (1934), is the earliest reference to jus cogens that one
can find in the Westlaw database. See also Arthur Lenhoff, Optional Terms (Jus
Dispositivum) and Required Terms (Jus Cogens) in the Law of Contracts, 45 MICH. L.
REV. 39 (1946). For a more extensive discussion of the use of the jus cogens concept in
civil law systems, see Levan Alexidze, Legal Nature of Jus Cogens in Contemporary
InternationalLaw, 172 RECUEL DES COURs 219, 233-42 (1981).
22.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1982).
23.
In U.S. scholarship, the earliest attempt to extend the civil law concept to
international law appears to be Alfred von Verdross, ForbiddenTreaties in International
Law, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 571 (1937). See also Alfred von Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and
Jus Cogens in InternationalLaw, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 55 (1966). Von Verdross wrote in an
older natural law tradition that based constraints on the power of states to contract on
concepts of reason and morality. He used the formulation "rules which hav[e] the
character of jus cogens," indicating that the term itself came from private law and here
served as an analogy. Id.
24.
See generally Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to
ProfessorHart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1957). Ironically, the largely symmetrical practice
of genocide and crimes against humanity by the Soviet state between 1932 and 1945, so
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one finds Hans Kelsen, writing shortly after the war, referring to "a
rule of international law which has the character of jus cogens so that
it cannot be affected by any treaty." 25 Here Kelsen seemed to
understand the reference as an analogy (hence "the character of'),
indicating that, just as public order trumps private ordering in
municipal law, something in international law might trump
state-to-state ordering achieved through international agreements.
However, Kelsen did not assert that this something exists, much less
define it or provide its provenance. Rather, he merely recognized a
logical possibility.
The problem with the private law analogy, as civil lawyers readily
acknowledge, is that the underlying constitutional hierarchy of
international law does not map onto that of domestic law.26 In the
nineteenth century in particular, private law on the continent often
functioned as a reservoir of legal order embedded in political systems
characterized by virtually unchecked sovereign prerogatives. The
German rechtsstaat, for example, rested on the core assumption that
the sovereign's will was supreme, but should be expressed
transparently, consistently, and in a manner that gave due regard to

compellingly documented in TIMOTHY SNYDER, BLOODLANDS: EUROPE BETWEEN HITLER
AND STALIN (2010), provoked no similar reaction. In part, the Soviet regime controlled
the people and territory where these acts occurred, and thus suppressed evidence of
their occurrence. In the immediate aftermath of the war, moreover, there was little
interest in stigmatizing an ally that had borne the greatest portion of the costs of the
conflict, even if a portion of those costs was self-inflicted.

25.

Hans Kelsen, Limitations on the Functions of the United Nations, 55 YALE

L.J. 997, 1007 (1946).
See, e.g., GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
26.
(5th ed. 1967).
Unlike municipal law, international customary law lacks rules of jus cogens or
international public policy, that is, rule which, by consent, individual subjects of
international law may not modify. In fact, jus cogens, as distinct from jus
dispositivum, presupposes the existence of an effective de jure order, which has
at its disposal legislative and judicial machinery, able to formulate rules of
public policy, and, in the last resort, can rely on overwhelming physical force.
Unorganized international society lacks such organs. It must be content to rely
on the majority of the subjects of international law acting in a spirit of
reasonableness. If, and as long as, they behave in this manner, their
self-restraint creates a de facto order of remarkable stability. On the level of
organised world society, the Principles of the United Nations formulated in
Article 2 of the Charter constitute consensual jus cogens, that is, rules of a de
jure order which may not be modified or abrogated by arrangements between
individual member states.
Id. at 29-30. For similar reservations, see Egon Schwelb, Some Aspects of International

Jus Cogens as Formulatedby the InternationalLaw Commission, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 946,
961 (1967) ("[This is necessary to illustrate the scope and the potentialities, but also the
vagueness, the elasticity, and the dangers of the concept of international jus

cogens. . . .").
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the domain of the civil law. 27 Jus cogens thus expressed the
sovereign's acknowledged authority to preempt private arrangements.
But in the international realm there is no meta-sovereign and
thus no evident peremptory power. As a matter of hierarchy, there
exists no higher body empowered to displace or alter the obligations
that states choose to assume, by treaty or through acceptance of
custom as legally binding. Domestic states typically have either
written constitutions or widely accepted assumptions about legitimate
order (or both), but the international world has neither of these
structures. Traditionally, international law derived solely from
sovereign consent, as there was no other authority to enact legal
norms.
To be sure, some theorists in the past blended in strains of divine
order or natural law as a means of constraining the dispositions of
sovereigns. 28 However, the underlying basis of these efforts shifted as
fashions in moral discourse changed. By the beginning of the twentieth
century, it seemed clear to most international lawyers that, whatever
it was that might constrain the production of international law, it
could not operate as does a domestic sovereign with clear authority to
preempt private ordering. Yet no consensus existed about any
alternative path to peremptory rules in international law.2 9
During the 1950s, the International Law Commission (ILC), a
body of experts working under UN auspices, sought to provide a kind
of constitutional order for the international legal system. From the
outset, the proponents of this project wanted to include jus cogens in

27.

See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAw

TRADITION-AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA

97 (3d ed. 2007) (describing different origins and functions of public and private law in
continental legal systems).
28.
For a discussion of these early attempts to divine limits on the rights of
sovereigns to make international law, see Stefan Kadelbach, Jus Cogens, Obligations
Erga Omnes and Other Rules-The Identification of Fundamental Norms, in THE
FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: JUS COGENS AND
OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 21, 21 (Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds.,
2006) and also George D. Haimbaugh, Jr., Jus Cogens: Root and Branch (An Inventory),
3 ToURO L. REV. 204, 207-11 (1987). Perhaps the strongest inkling in the immediate
postwar period of a conception of peremptory obligation that constrained sovereigns can
be found in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on reservations to
the Genocide Convention. In describing the Convention, the court spoke of its conception
"that the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by
civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation."
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28). Note the premise in this
statement that international law accepted the authority of civilized nations to impose
obligations on other states. It is exactly this premise that the Soviet conception of jus
cogens later forcefully rejected. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
29.
See supra note 26.
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this endeavor.30 This effort did not go unopposed. Hans Kelsen might
have been the best known of the critics, but Georg Schwarzenberger
produced the most extensive attack. He based his analysis on the
absence of international structures in a position to enact and enforce
jus cogens:
The evidence of international law on the level of unorganized
international society fails to bear out any claim for the existence of
international jus cogens. Viewed in historical and sociological
perspectives, this negative result of our inquiry is hardly surprising. It
required a prolonged development of primitive community laws before
such laws outgrew the stages of private vengeance and outlawry. The
rise of legal rules which bind without agreement between the parties
affected and which override any contradictory agreement presupposes
one of two things: the existence of authorities believed to be endowed
with supernatural powers (as when lawyer-priests administered jus
sacrum), or a centralized worldly power which would refuse to compound
31
at least offenses directed against itself or the community at large.

Absent either an international consensus about the legitimacy of
unofficial authorities or an effective international state, jus cogens
could not exist. Invocation of the concept served only as a device to
enable escapes from what Schwarzenberger considered legitimate
international law. 32
Significant opposition to the critical arguments came from within
the Soviet bloc. Beginning in the 1950s, Soviet theorists articulated a
theory of international law that both accepted the legitimacy of
international obligations and set significant limits on their scope. The
most significant product of this effort was the concept of peaceful
coexistence. Peaceful coexistence posited that: (1) two radically
opposed social, economic and political systems, namely socialism and
capitalism, existed in the contemporary world, and (2) current levels of
weapons technology made an armed conflict between these systems
unthinkable. International law could function only insofar as it

18, U.N. Doc. A/5601
30.
Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n to the Gen. Assembly,
(1963); see also [1963] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, at 213-15, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1963
(discussion of ILC).
31.
Georg Schwarzenberger, InternationalJus Cogens?, 43 TEX. L. REV. 455, 467
(1965).
32.
The delegates to the conference that approved the Vienna Convention on
Law of Treaties (VCLT) noted Schwarzenberger's objections. United Nations Conference
on the Law of Treaties, 1st Sess., Mar. 26-May 24, 1968, Official Records: Summary
Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Committee as the Whole, at
299, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11 (1969) [hereinafter Official Records] (statement of Chilean
representative). For later arguments critical of the jus cogens concept, see GEORG
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 27-56 (1971) and also JERZY
Szmucia, Jus COGENS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL (1974). For more recent criticism, see Gordon A. Christenson, Jus
Cogens: GuardingInterests Fundamentalto InternationalSociety, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 585
(1988); Gennady M. Danilenko, InternationalJus Cogens: Issues of Law-Making, 2 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 42 (1991); A. Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, as
Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina,17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1995).
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recognized and accommodated these two fundamental precepts. 33 The
theory thus supplied the peremptory authority that Schwarzenberger
believed that international law lacked.
Working within the peaceful coexistence framework, the Soviet
theorists found one aspect of jus cogens especially attractive. For them,
it provided an international law doctrine that could function as a
shield, i.e., as a limitation on the power of states to produce
international law. As a revolutionary regime, the Soviet regime sought
to limit and combat the international law that the "imperialist" states
previously generated. Then, once the outcome of World War II
established its status as a superpower, the Soviet Union sought a
mechanism to legitimize its control over the development of new rules
of international law. 34 Jus cogens fit the bill admirably.
G. I. Tunkin, the preeminent Soviet international law theorist
during its superpower phase, asserted that the theory of peaceful
coexistence, which asserted the impossibility of the use of force as a
means of resolving difference between the West and the Soviet camp,
provided a core principle in international relations. He asserted that
this theory provided the basis for peremptory norms in international
law:
The growth of the forces of socialism and progress, their increasing
influence, and the increase in this connection of the importance of moral
principles in international relations also promote the creation of
imperative principles and norms of international law. Therefore, the
quantity of imperative principles and norms in contemporary
35
international law is growing.

For Tunkin, international law's new imperative principles rested
not on bourgeois conceptions of morality that emphasize the
flourishing of the individual, but rather on the foundational conception
of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems.
He thus derived peremptory norms from the impermissibility of state
coercion:
Today, when the authority of the world socialist system and the
newly-independent states is growing steadily and the forces of peace are
becoming ever stronger, there is every reason to believe that the basic
principles and rules of international law will be further developed and

33.
See N. S. Khrushchev, On Peaceful Coexistence, 38 FOREIGN AFF., Oct. 1959,
at 1, 3-4 (1959) ("The principal of peaceful coexistence signifies a renunciation of
interference in the internal affairs of other countries with the object of altering their
system of government or mode of life or for any other motives."). The most prominent
work synthesizing post-war Soviet views of international law was PROBLEMY
MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA [PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] (G. I. Tunkin ed.,
1961).
34.
See Alexidze, supra note 21, at 249-51.
35.
G. I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 157 (William E. Butler trans.,
1974). Tunkin, as the Soviet representative in the International Law Commission, had
supported the inclusion of jus cogens in the VCLT. Summary Records of the Fifteenth
Session, [1963] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 69, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1963.
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strengthened, and that new principles and rules, directed at promoting
international co-operation and ensuring free development of the people
and the peaceful coexistence of states on the basis of equality, respect for
sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, will be
36
established.

In particular, Tunkin's conception of jus cogens implied a
prohibition of the use of coercive pressure by one state (including civil
litigation) to alter the manner in which another state dealt with the
personal liberties of its subjects. Such a lawsuit would disrespect the
sovereignty of another state, interfere in its domestic affairs, and
subvert sovereign equality by presupposing the right of one state to
elevate itself over another.37
Western specialists objected to the Soviet approach exactly
because it provided a basis for disregarding international obligations
that the West wished states to observe. They regarded the existing
system of international law as something that had built up over
centuries and that bound new as well as revolutionary states.38 A
realist might assert that the West constructed the status quo in their
own interests, for the most part without the participation of the Soviet
Union, its satellites, or the newly independent states, and that they
did not want to strain this system through a filter of the Soviet bloc's

G. I. Tunkin, Peaceful Coexistence and International Law, in
36.
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (G. I. Tunkin ed., 1969).
37.
See G. I. Tunkin, The Contemporary Theory of Soviet InternationalLaw, 31
CONTEMP. LEGAL PROBS. 177, 185 (1978). Tunkin states:
Contemporary international law prohibits the resort to war, the use or threat of
force and obligates states to settle their disputes by peaceful means only....
Contemporary international law is a law of peace, a law aimed first of all at
ensuring international peace, which is the greatest common interest of all
mankind... . Contemporary international law is in its essence anti-colonial. It is
a law of equality, self-determination and freedom of peoples. . . . According to
contemporary international law, states have the duty to co-operate with one
another in resolving international problems. Contemporary international law,
reflecting changes that have taken place in society after the Great October
Socialist Revolution, has turned its face to the human being. The problem of
international co-operation in ensuring respect for human rights has become one
of the principle problems of contemporary international law.
Id. The statement about human rights, viewed in isolation, might be seen as an
endorsement of the contemporary human rights program, and in particular of the
equation of fundamental human rights with jus cogens norms. But, as the references to
the October Revolution and the duty of international cooperation suggest, the conception
of human rights incorporated in this reference involved the right to participate in, and
benefit from socialist construction, and not personal rights of freedom from state
coercion. The idea of one or several states imposing sanctions on another in response to
infringement of individual interests was anathema to this conception of international
law. See OLIMPIAD S. IOFFE, HUMAN RIGHTS 61-62 (Thomas J. Joyce ed., 1983)
(describing Soviet approach to individual rights protection in international law).
38.
See, e.g., Leon Lipson, Peaceful Coexistence, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 871,
872 (1964); The Rise and Fall of "Peaceful Coexistence" in InternationalLaw, 1 PAPERS
ON SOVIET LAW 6 (1977).
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devising. They thus resisted any concept-including jus cogens-that
would diminish the present body of international law in the absence of
general state assent to the diminution.
Within the ILC, this debate was resolved largely on the Soviet
side. In 1966, the ILC reported out an instrument that contained a
provision purporting to codify jus cogens. The draft treaty stated that
this category of norms existed, that the norms did not permit any
derogation, and that treaties that violated such a norm were void. It
did not, however, clarify what constituted jus cogens.39
Following the ILC recommendation, the UN General Assembly
convened a conference to consider adoption of the proposal. 40 During
the two sessions of conference in 1968 and 1969, the jus cogens
proposal proved polarizing, as the shadow of the Cold War defined the
debate. The United States and its allies criticized the ILC's draft
article and sought to water it down by setting strict limits to what
would qualify as a jus cogens norm. 4 1 In contrast, representatives of
the Soviet bloc and some newly independent states embraced the ILC's
language.4 2 The conference rejected the U.S. amendment by a vote of
57 to 24, with 7 abstentions. 43 It adopted the final version on a first
reading by a vote of 72 to 3, but with 18 abstentions and with countries
such as the United States stating that its support was provisional and
dependent on creation of an authoritative dispute resolution
mechanism. At a second reading the vote was 87 to 8, with 12
abstentions. In its final form, the article read:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the
present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
44
having the same character.

39.
Official Records, supra note 32, at 66-68.
40.
G.A. Res. 2166 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 9, U.N. Doc.
A/6309/Rev.1, at 95 (Dec. 5, 1966).
41.
Official Records, supra note 32, at 295 (objections of U.S. representative); id.
at 304-05 (objections of British representative); id. at 309-10 (objection of French
representative); id. at 316-17 (objections of Australian representative); id. at 330
(objections of U.S. representative); id. (further objections of British representative); id.
at 331 (objections of French representative); id. at 472 (representatives of Britain,
France, and United States expressing concerns about text of article).
42.
Id. at 294 (support of Soviet representative); id. at 296-97 (support of Cuban
representative for text and attack on proposed U.S. amendment); id. at 307 (support of
Byelorussian representative); id. at 311-12 (support of Hungarian representative); id. at
312-13 (support of Romanian representative); id. at 313-14 (support of Bulgarian
representative); id. at 322 (support of Ukrainian representative).
43.
Id. at 333.
44.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
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It is with this instrument that the discussion of jus cogens in
international law really begins.
The promulgation of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties
(VCLT) hardly ended the controversy over jus cogens. Even in its
indefinite and hedged form, the ILC's formulation scared off
significant actors. The British, French, and U.S. governments referred
to this provision as a particular instance where the VCLT sought to
change, rather than codify, international custom and accordingly
opposed it. The United Kingdom ultimately overcame its scruples and
joined the treaty, but France and the United States did not.45 Thus,
two permanent members of the UN Security Council, one of which
today functions as the only superpower in the global system, spurned
the ILC's handiwork. The Soviet Union, the other superpower at the
time of the VCLT's promulgation, stayed out of the regime until 1986,
and when it did join, it lodged a reservation barring international
dispute resolution of any issues relating to the jus cogens article except
on its own terms.46 Other significant international powers, including
the nuclear states of India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan as well
as the emerging nuclear state Iran, have not ratified the VCLT. Even
though some of these nonparties, such as the United States, concede
that portions of the VCLT reflect customary international law, they do
not agree that the jus cogens article does. 47
Moreover, although the VCLT was reasonably clear about what
jus cogens did, it did not provide much light on what actually
constitutes jus cogens. Its definition of jus cogens norms raises more
questions than it answers. First, a norm exists only if it is "accepted
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole."

45.
The United Kingdom joined the treaty on June 25, 1971. For the current
status of the treaty, see Status: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsll.aspx?&src=
TREATY&mtdsg-no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang-en (last visited Oct.
1, 2011).
46.
The Soviet reservation stated, in relevant part:
[I]n order for any dispute among the Contracting Parties concerning the
application or the interpretation of articles 53 or 64 to be submitted to the
International Court of Justice for a decision or for any dispute concerning the
application or interpretation of any other articles in Part V of the Convention to
be submitted for consideration by the Conciliation Commission, the consent of
all the parties to the dispute is required in each separate case, and that the
conciliators constituting the Conciliation Commission may only be persons
appointed by the parties to the dispute by common consent.

Id.
47.
For the argument that the limited endorsement by the United States of the
Convention partially restated customary international law, see Maria Frankowska, The

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L L.
281, 299-301 (1988).
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But what constitutes the "whole" of the international community? 48 If
this language implies unanimity (certainly not the only possibility),
then what does it take to accept and recognize a norm? If unanimity is
unnecessary, how many actors must agree? If even one state noisily
flouts a norm, does that suffice to render it non-peremptory? How
noisy must the flouting be, and what constitutes flouting? Second, the
"whole" of the international community must not only recognize the
norm in question, but also accept and recognize that it is
nonderogable. But how does a state that accepts a norm signal
separately its recognition of the norm's nonderogable status? For
example, the UN Charter, which states that its obligations "shall
prevail" over obligations based on other international agreements,
does not state that treaties contradicting the Charter are thereby
void. 49 Yet the ILC offered the Charter as a quintessential example of
ajus cogens norm.50

The notion of jus cogens as a new factor in international law,
potentially suggestive of an underlying constitutional order,
nonetheless enjoyed some local popularity in the years following the
promulgation of the VCLT. Notwithstanding U.S. objections to the
concept, the American Law Institute's Third Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law embraced it. Like the ILC, the Restatement cited the
obligations of the UN Charter as an example of a jus cogens norm. 51
Less surprisingly, Soviet specialists also enthusiastically embraced
the jus cogens argument. As noted above, however, their reasons for
doing so should not make contemporary human rights advocates
happy.
It would, of course, be too simplistic to depict the international
community at the end of the 1970s as divided into two camps, one led
by the United States, which insisted on the central and exclusive force
of state consent in the making of international law, and another led by

48.
The United States argued that each important member of the international
community possessed a veto over the recognition of a jus cogens norm. Official Records,
supra note 28, at 66-68. But the Conference as a whole did not address this contention.
49.
U.N. Charter art. 103; see SZTUCKI, supra note 32, at 97 ("Art.
103 . .. confers superior character upon the obligations under the Charter, but which at
the same time does not provide for the invalidity of treaties inconsistent with it, is but
one-most remarkable-example of such norms.").
50.
Summary Records of the Fifteenth Session, supra note 35, at 17.
51.

§ 102

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

cmt. k (1987). The Restatement also enumerated several human rights obligations
that, it asserted, had become jus cogens obligations. Id. § 702 cmt. n. For further
development of this position by the Restatement's reporter, see Louis Henkin, Human
Rights and State Sovereignty, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31 (1995). For criticism of the
use of jus cogens in this project, see Anthony D'Amato, Human Rights as Part of
Customary International Law: A Plea for a Change of Paradigms, 25 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 47 (1995). For a historical analysis of the Restatement's position on these
issues, see Paul B. Stephan, Courts, the Constitution,and CustomaryInternationalLaw:
The Intellectual Origins of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 33 (2003).
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the Soviet Union, which barred the production of international law
that interfered with certain underlying principles of the international
order. But one can fairly can describe the concept of jus cogens at that
time as deeply controversial, in large part due to a lack of agreement
about the fundamental nature of the international system.
Moreover, the debate during the 1960s and 1970s focused entirely
on the existence of a check on the enforcement of international legal
obligations (the shield). One can find little evidence at that time for a
widespread (or even substantial) belief that jus cogens endowed the
international order with rights that its agents could enforce against
states (the sword).5 2 The vision of jus cogens as a sword emerged only
later, once the bipolar superpower world wound down and a new
human rights paradigm emerged.
The 1980s saw further developments in jus cogens law. The most
significant was the ICJ's decision in the Case ConcerningMilitary and
ParamilitaryActivities in and Against Nicaragua.5 Although the
authority of the case is somewhat impaired because of the
nonparticipation of the United States, it nonetheless represents the
high point of jus cogens jurisprudence in the ICJ. 54
In the Military and Paramilitary Activities case, jus cogens
functioned as both a sword and a bootstrap. Because the United States
had validly reserved its consent to ICJ jurisdiction over any dispute
resting on a multilateral treaty, the ICJ lacked the authority to
determine whether U.S. support of armed attacks on Nicaragua
violated the UN Charter. To hurdle this obstacle, the ICJ determined
that the obligation not to use force rests not only on the Charter, but
also on customary international law that attained jus cogens status. To
support this conclusion, the Court referred to the assertion of the ILC
that a ban on the use of force in interstate relations "constitutes a
conspicuous example of a rule of international law having the
character of jus cogens."5 5 This obligation gave the ICJ a basis for

For a discussion of the emergence in the 1970s of human rights as a new
52.
paradigm of international relations, see SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN
RIGHTS INHISTORY (2010).
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
53.

U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
The United States had argued that the ICJ was incompetent to adjudicate
54.
issues that the UN Charter relegated to the exclusive jurisdiction of the UN Security
Council. After the ICJ rejected this argument, the United States refused to participate
in the proceedings. The United States vetoed a Security Council resolution that would
have required it to pay reparations to Nicaragua in accordance with lCJ's judgment.
U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2704th mtg. at 54-55, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2704 (July 31, 1986). A
U.S. court subsequently determined that the ICJ's decision had no legal effect in the
United States. Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C.
Cir. 1988). For strong criticism of the U.S. position on the ICJ's authority by one of
Nicaragua's representatives in the dispute, see Abram Chayes, Nicaragua,the United
States, and the World Court, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1445 (1985).

55.

Military and ParamilitaryActivities, 1986 I.C.J. at 90 (citing Summary

Records of the 880th Meeting, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 247, U.N.

Doc.
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taking action against the United States, notwithstanding its lack of
competence over Charter-based claims against that country.
Unpacking the significance of the ICJ's invocation of jus cogens is
difficult. Once the Court established that non-use of force had become
customary law, it did not need jus cogens to apply this rule to the
United States. Evidence that the United States accepted this norm
would have sufficed. What additional work did jus cogens do in the
opinion?
In one sense, the Court used the concept to increase the scope of a
state's international obligations. The doctrine empowered a tribunal to
enforce a customary norm that, as a matter of treaty law, appeared to
be non-justiciable. This point is muddied somewhat, however, by the
failure of the ICJ to make clear exactly why it mattered that the
obligation not to use force had attained jus cogens status. If the
non-use norm instead functioned as a rule of customary international
law from which the United States did not seek to derogate, would it not
work just as well in establishing a legal obligation that the ICJ could
enforce against the United States? 56 If this conjecture is correct, then
the jus cogens character of the norm might not add that much of a
sword or a bootstrap.
Moreover, the duty that the ICJ saw the international order as
imposing on the United States was a traditional international
obligation in the sense that by its character the obligation was owed
only to another state, and not to non-state actors. Thus, the ICJ's
decision maintained the conception of international law as embracing
state-to-state obligations. The jus cogens norm invoked in the case
expanded the legal duties owed by the United States to Nicaragua, but
not the duties that any state owed to particular individuals. In this

A/CN.4/SER.A/1966). Earlier references to jus cogens in international law by individual
members of the ICJ include Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J.
3, 69 (Dec. 19) (dissenting opinion of Judge de Castro) (describing the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 45, art. 53); Nuclear Test (Austl. v. Fr.),
1974 I.C.J. 253, 405 (Dec. 20) (dissenting opinion of Judge Barwick) (arguing for absence
of any applicable jus cogens norm in the case at hand); Legal Consequences for States of
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 15, 90
(Jan. 29) (separate opinion of Judge Ammoun) (arguing about the right to
self-determination); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 304 (Feb. 5) (separate opinion of Judge Ammoun) (principles in
Preamble of UN Charter); North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 97
(Feb. 20) (separate opinion of Judge Padillo Nervo) (general reference to concept); South
West Africa (Eth. v. S. Mr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6, 297 (July 18) (dissenting opinion of Judge
Tanaka) (addressing a law concerning the protection of human rights, specifically norm
of nondiscrimination reflecting natural law).
56.
I put to one side the question of what the United States would have had to do
not to be bound by such a customary norm. For a discussion on this point, see Curtis A.
Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202
(2010) (noting and criticizing the recent trend towards wide acceptance of the
'Mandatory View," which provides that nations do not have a legal right to unilaterally
withdraw from the rules of customary international law).
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sense, then, the decision reflected a conception of jus cogens as a
means for regulating interstate relations, not as a mechanism that
addresses the relation of states and their subjects.
The end of the Cold War led to a fundamental reorientation in
international law. The waning of general state-to-state confrontation
diminished the importance of duties owed by states to each other and
opened up new areas of international cooperation. One of the fields
that took off at this time was international human rights, understood
as the set of obligations that international law imposed on states with
regard to their treatment of persons. Advocates sought to use tools
that evolved in an earlier context to strengthen and expand the
international law of human rights. In the case ofjus cogens, this meant
finding peremptory norms regarding duties owed to persons, rather
than to states.
The next ICJ case, the only other instance in which that body as a
whole addressed a question of jus cogens on the merits, reflected this
transformation. In the Case Concerningthe Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) attacked Belgium's
attempt to prosecute its foreign minister. 57 The DRC asserted a
traditional international law argument, namely that, as a matter of
customary international law, a sitting head of state enjoyed complete
immunity from the judicial process of other states. Belgium rested its
response on a claimed authority to enforce the rights of individuals
under international law. Because the foreign minister stood accused of
transgressing human rights based on jus cogens, Belgium argued, it
could violate the DRC's sovereign immunity. The ICJ rejected
Belgium's argument:
The Court has carefully examined State practice, including national
legislation and those few decisions of national higher courts, such as the
House of Lords or the French Court of Cassation. It has been unable to
deduce from this practice that there exists under customary
international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity
from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for
Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected of having committed war
58
crimes or crimes against humanity.

Whatever duties the DRC had to individuals, they were not so strong
as to overcome the immunity ratiopersonae of a head of state. Thus, it

Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 3
57.
(Feb. 14).
58.
Id. at 24. This case is limited to the issue of immunity rationepersonae, i.e.,
immunity due to the current occupation of a high office such as head of state, foreign
minister, or ambassador. It thus does not shed much light on the balance between
immunity and jus cogens in other contexts. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence
R. Helfer, InternationalLaw and the U.S. Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity,
2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 238 (noting that the ICJ's decision was largely motivated by the
current status of the minister, whose status entitled him to "full immunity from criminal
jurisdiction and inviolability" even for "war crimes or crimes against humanity.").
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appears, a sitting high government official does not have to answer to
other states for official conduct, no matter how heinous.
Human rights advocates find this decision troubling. Proponents
of jus cogens claims can read the Arrest Warrant decision as limited to
the narrow instance where the principles of non-interference and
sovereign equality come together in the well-established principle of
head-of-state immunity. A skeptic, however, can argue that, in the
view of the ICJ, even the gravest violations of international human
rights do not justify suspension of at least some of the general
principles of international law on which sovereign immunity rests.59
While the Arrest Warrant case did not vindicate the human rights
claim, it does illustrate how jus cogens arguments shifted from
protection of states to protection of persons. A later decision by a
different international (some would say supranational) tribunal
extended this transformation. In Kadi v. Council, the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) had to choose between honoring duties imposed by the
UN Charter and developing the procedural norms applicable to official
interference with property rights. 60 The Court of First Instance
argued that jus cogens provided the sole means for making the choice.
The Grand Chamber took a more expansive approach to human rights
law, in the process turning traditional jus cogens arguments on their
head.
The dispute involved a European Community (EC) regulation
implementing decisions of a committee established by the UN Security
Council (UNSC) to interdict financial support of terrorism. Various
UNSC resolutions obligate states to freeze the financial assets of

59.
At a minimum the Court's decision contradicts the position of a few
advocates that sovereign immunity itself has only a limited and contingent role to play
in the international system. For an example of this effort, see Lee M. Caplan, State
Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy
Theory, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 741, 748 (2003) (claiming that sovereign immunity is evolving
from "an exception to the principle of state jurisdiction").
One should note the International Law Commission's evolving interpretation of jus
cogens. Its Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
adopted in 2001, comes closer to the sword vision of the concept than did the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Draft Articles on State Responsibility for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, arts. 26, 40-41. Official Records of the General
Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1 The views of
this body, while prestigious, have no direct legal effect. Also relevant is the decision of
the European Court of Human Rights in Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct.
H.R. 79. The Al-Adsani decision does not shed much light on the issue before the ICJ,
however. First, it addressed the question of whether international law mandated an
exception to sovereign immunity, not whether international law permits such an
exception. Second, notwithstanding the language of the decision, the case ultimately
turned on lex specialis, namely the European Convention on Human Rights, and not on
general rules of customary international law.
60.
Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649, rev'd, Joined Cases
C-402/05 and C-415/05, Kadi v. Council, 2008 E.C.R. 1-6351. For a later decision holding
invalid the regulation adopted to replace the one struck down in the first round of
litigation, see Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Comm'n, 2010 E.C.R. II (forthcoming).
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persons identified by the committee. 61 The committee put on the list
Yassin Kadi, a Saudi resident who controlled a foundation in Sweden.
Kadi and his foundation attacked the EC's freeze of their assets,
arguing that the EC did not provide him with an adequate opportunity
to challenge the terrorist designation. The Court of First Instance
framed the issue as whether there existed any higher authority to
release the EC from its obligation to implement UNSC decisions. The
court reasoned that the EC could disregard the UNSC if, and only if,
that body had contravened a jus cogens norm of international law. 62
Whatever the procedural defects of the process through which the
committee put together its list of funders of terrorism, the court
argued, the outcome did not constitute a jus cogens violation. As a
result, the court rejected Kadi's challenge. 63
On appeal, the Grand Chamber of the ECJ refrained the question.
First, it determined that the rules that a U.S. lawyer would describe as
procedural due process emanated from the various treaties
constituting European law, even though none to which the EC was a
party specifically adverts to such norms. 64 Second, it reasoned that an
obligation to implement UNSC decisions, although grounded
ultimately on the UN Charter, could not override these procedural
rules. The obligation to apply European law trumped other treaty
obligations, including those in the UN Charter that applied directly to
the EC's member states.6 5
Although the Grand Chamber's decision disavowed the jus cogens
doctrine as such, its elevation of unwritten human rights norms over
express, treaty-based commitments operates exactly in the manner
that the human rights conception of jus cogens does. But this move
illustrates a deep tension between the human rights paradigm and the
traditional jus cogens project. An earlier generation, including the
authors of the U.S. Third Restatement, regarded the obligations of the

The original measure was UN Security Council Resolution 1267. S.C. Res.
61.
1267, T 4(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
At least one European national court also has embraced the argument that
62.
jus cogens provides a state with a basis to violate its obligations under a resolution of the
UN Security Council. Like the European Court of First Instance, a Swiss court upheld
the Security Council terrorist financing regime as not violating any such rule.
Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Nov. 14, 2007, 133 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] II 450 (Switz.).
Kadi, 2005 E.C.R. 11-3649 1 294.
63.
In the United States, it seems reasonably well settled that the government
64.
must comply with constitutional standards of due process when designating persons and
organizations as supporters of terrorism. See People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S.
Dept. of State, 613 F.3d 220, 222 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (remanding designation because the
Secretary failed to accord the organization due process protections). While that case did
not involve an organization that the United Nations had designated as a supporter of
terrorism, there is no reason to believe that U.S. courts would reach a different result in
such instances. Compliance with a resolution of the Security Council is not generally
justiciable in the United States. Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
65.
For my earlier discussion of the Kadi case, see supra note 60.
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UN Charter as a paradigmatic example of an international norm that
states lack the capacity to disavow. By subordinating an express
Charter obligation to comply with UNSC decisions relating to the
maintenance of peace and security, the court effectively inverted the
hierarchy the earlier generation envisioned.
Kadi suggests that jus cogens (or something like it), rather than
establishing the foundation (grundnorm) on which international law
rests, instead provides a mechanism for brushing aside the bounds of
those international law obligations that have become inconvenient.
Rather than anchoring international law to something stable and
deep, the ECJ's move seems to fulfill the concerns expressed by the
Western powers at the time of the debate over Article 53 of the Vienna
Convention: the jus cogens concept makes international legal
obligations less stable and reliable.
One might respond, of course, that whatever international
lawyers thought in the 1940s or the 1980s, it now has become clear,
and will remain clear, that core human rights protections dwell at the
heart of the international law project. 6 6 One might cite the emergence
of international criminal tribunals and the assertion by several
European states of universal jurisdiction over transgressions of these
rights as evidence of this development. Human rights thus anchor the
current conception of jus cogens in a fundamental aspect of
contemporary international law. Instability across time, the argument
might continue, is inevitable in such a politically contingent field as
international law. What matters is that, for now, international law
values nothing more than the vindication of certain core human rights.
Arguments of this sort enjoy great support among academic specialists
and lie at the heart of the decision of the Corte Suprema di Cassazione.
To summarize, the idea that some fundamental principles of
international law impose obligations on states in spite of inconsistent
treaties or custom is a product of the postwar era, although earlier
theorists sought to enlist natural law or other moral values into
international law to similar purpose. The ILC's effort to propound a
treaty that codified one aspect of jus cogens, namely its restriction on a
state's treaty-making power, provoked a split along traditional Cold
War lines, but put the topic on the international agenda. During the
era of superpower rivalry, the leading governments in the West
expressed skepticism about the concept out of concern that it would
undermine the stability of treaties. The Soviet side, however, endorsed
the concept due to its convergence with the principle of peaceful

66.
See generally Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus
Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 331 (2009); Christopher A. Ford, Adjudicating Jus Cogens,
13 WIs. INT'L L.J. 145 (1994); Kadelbach, supra note 28; Karen Parker & Lyn Beth
Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 411 (1989); Markus Petsche, Jus Cogens as a Vision of the InternationalLegal
Order, 29 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 233 (2010).
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coexistence, understood as a reservation of a veto over the
development of international rules. As long as bipolar competition
dominated international relations, sovereigns invoked jus cogens
mostly to guard their prerogatives against international interference.
With the end of that era, people looked to new uses for jus cogens, one
of which was the bolstering of human rights protection. Some
European governments and many international law specialists in
particular have embraced this move.
III. A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF JUS COGENS
Debates over the content of jus cogens have distracted attention
from the mechanisms for production of these norms. At its heart, the
concept has only the loosest of connection to state consent and acts of
state power. Instead, it allows actors engaged in dispute resolution to
propose checks on what states can do, the protestations of officials
notwithstanding. The check can function as a shield, undoing the legal
basis for a state action; a sword, imposing an obligation on states not
to infringe the interests of private persons; and as a bootstrap,
expanding the authority of international tribunals to vindicate those
interests they see as fundamental.
The immediate question facing the international system is
whether jus cogens will continue along the path of the last two
decades, serving as a buttress to legal rules limiting what states can do
to persons, or whether it will instead reemerge in the form envisioned
by an earlier generation and memorialized to a certain extent in the
VCLT. The prevailing conception today regards jus cogens as imposing
duties on states and therefore creating corresponding rights in the
international order (the sword). The earlier vision saw jus cogens as
creating privileges in states and a corresponding non-right in the
international order (the shield). The sword is closely related with the
human rights revolution because international human rights impose
duties rather than conferring privileges on states. The shield is tied to
the principles of sovereign independence, non-interference in domestic
affairs, and sovereign equality, all of which provide a rationale for
resisting obligations that the international order otherwise might
impose on states. In this section, I will consider separately the sword
and the shield of jus cogens.
A. Jus Cogens as a Sword
This vision of jus cogens allows the imposition of duties on states
and thus the creation of rights in the international order, whether a
state consents to the imposition or not. The invocation and application
of jus cogens as a sword is naturally attractive to non-state actors and
official organs that operate largely free of political control. To the
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extent that private persons, domestic courts, and international
tribunals can act as agents of the international order to enforce these
rights, their power and influence grows.
In a world of judicial independence and robust civil institutions,
the move to jus cogens becomes enormously consequential.
Empowering non-state actors and judges to wield a doctrine that
trumps state consent takes on meaning once the exercise of this power
in opposition to state preferences becomes possible. Seen in this light,
the rise of jus cogens becomes one more piece of evidence for the claim
that the end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization resulted in
the hollowing out of the state. 67 What results is, in effect, the
privatization of international law, a shift in authority over
international lawmaking from political actors to other interested
persons. It also should surprise no one that international and
supranational bodies, much more than national governments, have
done much of the heavy lifting in developing the sword vision of jus
cogens.68 Acceptance of the doctrine expands their influence.
Sovereign immunity, the subject of this colloquium, illustrates
how the sword function works. Analysis might begin with an
assessment of the rational interests of government officials left to their
own devices. 69 Ceteris paribus, immunity from civil suits in foreign
courts, meets the needs of these actors. Defending such suits takes
time and money and may lead to embarrassment. Under pressure from
the people they represent or rule, these officials might tolerate suits
against foreign actors, but they always should prefer immunity for
themselves. If the absence of a selfish hegemon (which would reserve
immunity for its own actors and impose liability on everyone else's)
makes this most desirable of all outcomes unattainable for anyone,

67.
The literature on this point is vast. See, e.g., KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING
THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN
SOCIAL
EUROPE (2001); RESTRUCTURING WORLD POLITICS: TRANSNATIONAL
MOVEMENTS, NETWORKS, AND NORMS (Sanjeev Khagram et al. eds., 2002); ANNE-MARIE
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE:
THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (Steve Smith et al. eds., 1996); Jean
Louise Cohen, Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus InternationalLaw, 18 ETHICS & INT'L
AFF., Dec. 2004, at 1; John 0. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western State and the Rise of
the Regime of InternationalFederalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 903 (1996); Saskia Sassen,
Neither Global Nor National: Novel Assemblages of Territory, Authority and Rights, 1
ETHICS & GLOBAL POL. 61 (2008); Phillip Trimble, Globalization, International
Institutions and the Erosion of National Sovereignty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944 (1997).
68.
See, e.g., Jos6 E. Alvarez, Governing the World: InternationalOrganizations
as Lawmakers, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 591, 594 (2008) (noting that jus cogens
is largely a product of the work of international organizations).
69.
There are many more conceptions of international relations than that of
rational actors, but this is the tradition in which I work. For a discussion of the work of
rational-actor models in theories of international lawmaking and enforcement, see
ROBERT E. ScoTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY
AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 52-56 (2006).
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then surely officials would regard the second best world as one of no
accountability to foreign courts for any governmental actors.7 0
Such a strong immunity rule might appeal to officials, but it may
not constitute an optimal outcome for the world as a whole. Expanded
accountability might deter wrongdoing and promote better
governance. Collaboration between private actors, independent courts,
and tribunals might better serve important public goals by overcoming
the self-interested opposition of officials to judicial scrutiny.
To be sure, official opposition to liability might not be entirely
selfish. Lawsuits may cause frictions with foreign states and thus
endanger valuable cooperation. Some countries' civil litigation systems
might have unusual or eccentric procedures that alarm potential
defendants, such as civil juries, class action mechanisms, punitive
damages, and contingent fee arrangements. Putative plaintiffs might
sue for publicity, political leverage, or malice. States legitimately
might employ mechanisms to sort out worthy suits from those that do
more harm than good. The question is, what mechanisms best achieve
a desirable separation of worthwhile from undesirable lawsuits?
As a matter of logic as well as modern practice, three types of
domestic mechanisms present themselves. First, one might permit the
legislature to prescribe rules for judges to apply. Litigants and courts
could seek to exploit any interpretive ambiguity, but sufficiently clear
statutory rules would limit their discretion. The United States and the
United Kingdom, among others, take this approach. 7 ' Second, one
might permit the government to invoke immunity on behalf of foreign
sovereigns. This mechanism minimizes the role of private actors and
maximizes the importance of politicians. The United States, among
other countries, did this before 1976, when Congress enacted the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 2 Third, one might leave it to the

70.
One might note in passing that the United States, the closest thing to a
hegemon that exists in the present world, does embrace some one-sided immunity rules.
It permits the President to designate certain states as state sponsors of terror, a
determination that then allows U.S. persons to sue that state in a U.S. court for injuries
due to torture, extrajudicial killing, and certain violent acts. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2006).
But it has not waived its immunity in its courts for similar acts undertaken by its own
officials and employees, at least when those agents act within the scope of their
authority. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (dismissing suit under
Federal Tort Claims Act as well as limiting the Alien Tort Statute); Wilson v. Libby, 535
F.3d 697, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (dismissing suit against government officials as properly
against the United States); Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 200 (2d Cir. 2008), rev'd en
banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (refusing to find cause of action); Lebron v. Rumsfeld,
764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 798 (D.S.C. 2011) (finding no cause of action for detention as
unlawful enemy combatant); In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 95
(D.D.C. 2007) (same). But cf. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1020-21 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (recognizing constitutional claim by U.S. citizen detained in United States).
71.
See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2006); State
Immunities Act, 1978, c. 33, § 1 (U.K.).
72.
See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2280 (2010) (discussing the
common law doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity); Bradley & Helfer, supra note 58,
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courts to craft the immunity rules that they might apply. International
law might set the boundaries for appropriate judicial choices, but
domestic courts and the advocates who appear before them would have
freedom to determine where those boundaries lie. Many countries,
including Germany and Italy, appear to take this approach.
Jus cogens can affect these mechanisms in at least two ways. Its
most powerful potential role is as an override of legislative choices. A
minority of the European Court of Human Rights has asserted that
the European Convention on Human Rights obligates states to
recognize a jus cogens exception to foreign sovereign immunity,
domestic legislative preferences notwithstanding.7 3 If a consensus in
international law were to embrace this position, then the first and
second mechanisms no longer would be acceptable. International
tribunals could sanction states that enforce such legislation or use
executive power to block suits, and domestic courts would have a free
pass to impose liability on foreign states for at least some human
rights violations. Many in the human rights community might wish for
74
this outcome, but present practice seems very much to the contrary.
Alternatively, jus cogens can dominate the third mechanism by
allowing courts, in the absence of any legislative or treaty commitment
to the contrary, to suspend state immunity in particular instances. A
decision by the ICJ in favor of Italy, for example, could have this effect,
even though its ruling as a formal matter would bind only the two
state parties. As a structural matter, private advocates would have
greater freedom to persuade both international tribunals and domestic
courts to adjudicate human rights claims, and thus would have
increased ability to subject states to international oversight.
Either of these outcomes would shift the balance of policy away
from avoiding international friction and toward increasing
governmental accountability. As suggested above, there exists no
evidence at present to indicate as a general matter the costs and
benefits of such a move. The costs of friction, perhaps in the form of

at 220. The act of state doctrine, at least as it functions in U.S. law, has functional effects
comparable to immunity, and for a range of cases (e.g., disputes over ownership of assets
in the United States) the Executive Branch has unreviewable authority to invoke it.
Second Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2010). For criticism of
proposals to revive unreviewable executive discretion to recognize immunity in the wake
of Samantar, see Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S.
Courts: The Case Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 915, 922 (2011)
(arguing that federal common law, and not unreviewable executive discretion, should
provide basis for official immunity).
Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, para. 60.
73.
Compare Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Alien Tort Claims, Sovereign Immunity and
74.
InternationalLaw in U.S. Courts, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 323, 329 (1988) (arguing that courts
should read a jus cogens exception into the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to meet
U.S. international law obligations), with Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 2009)
(recognizing immunity of foreign official accused of extrajudicial killing and grave
breaches of laws of war), and Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1176
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding no jus cogens exception in Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
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tit-for-tat retaliation, might outweigh the benefits of accountability.
States with weak civil institutions and relatively great political,
military and economic power-think China-might impose
considerable costs on the international system while thwarting
significant levels of accountability. Or the threat of external
accountability, whether before international tribunals or foreign
domestic courts, might induce states to behave better rather than to
retaliate. Courts might make good guesses about where to draw the
line, or might miss the mark entirely. The most one can say with
confidence is that growth in the power ofjus cogens will seem desirable
to those who trust courts and tribunals to do the right thing and worry
about selfish decisions by government officials, while entrenching the
status quo will appeal to those who believe that officials have a unique
advantage in managing international conflicts and worry about the
hubris of judges, arbiters, and advocates.75
One extreme case would provide a strong test of these
predispositions. Were a strong sword vision of the jus cogens concept to
prevail and impose an obligation to reject immunity in cases involving
allegations of grave human rights abuses, then international law
would lock states into a system of judicial management. International
instruments such as the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property, which does not contain a jus
cogens exception to immunity, would transgress the jus cogens
principle of the VCLT. 76 Countries such as the United States and the
United Kingdom, which have statutes that fail to recognize such an
exception, would be considered in violation of international law. The
international legal system, in other words, would insist on only one
institutional response to the problem of balancing the costs and
benefits of limiting immunity-judicial management.
This outcome is not unthinkable, but it does set the limiting case
for a combination of optimism about judging and pessimism about
politicians. It presumably would expect judges to take into account the
judgments expressed through legislation and treaties, but also to
retain the final say as the appropriate balance between avoiding
international friction and vindicating core international interests.
This outcome rests on an especially strong assumption about the

Cf. Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesty: U.S. Litigation in the Mirror of
75.
International Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 628 (2002) (expressing concern about
judicial competence in formulation of international law).
76.
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Property, G.A. Res. 59/38, Annex, U.N. Doc. AIRES/59/38 (Dec. 16, 2004). As of
this writing, this Convention has 28 signatories, 11 of whom have ratified or accepted
the instrument. It will not go into effect until 30 parties join. Status: Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg-no
=III- 13&chapter=3&lang-en#Participants (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
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ability of judges, acting either through domestic
international tribunals, to influence state behavior.

courts

or

B. Jus Cogens as a Shield

The sword analysis assumes that both non-state actors engaged
in dispute resolution and the organs that resolve disputes function free
of state control. These actors can make independent judgments about
what norms constitute jus cogens and what state acts count as
transgressions. The organs in turn can enforce their decisions against
states and expect compliance. To what extent are these assumptions
valid?
In the liberal democratic world of Europe and North America and
in a few other parts of the world, robust civil society and independent
judges largely hold sway. During the bipolar world that ended two
decades ago, however, one would have had to concede that the majority
of people did not live in such an environment. An unstated premise of
the Soviet position was the insignificance of non-state actors in the
development of principles of international law, jus cogens included.
The Soviet Union and its allies presumed they could maintain effective
control over nominally independent judges and all elements of civil
society, international law jurists in particular. Party and security
organs took care of this within the bloc. The Soviet Union and its allies
also barred any international tribunal from exercising jurisdiction
over their international legal obligations, except on terms that allowed
them to retain control over the process. The bloc enjoyed sufficient
security resources and economic autarky to resist outside pressure."
To the publicists on the Soviet side who promoted the jus cogens
concept during the Cold War, then, the possibility that their proposal
would lead to a shift in power would have made no sense.
What of the contemporary world? From 1989 to 2000, we
witnessed a remarkable move away from dictatorships and toward
political pluralism and civil liberty, marked not only by the collapse of
the Soviet bloc, but the also the end of apartheidin South Africa and
more complicated reforms in East Asia. One plausibly might have
believed at that time that the influence of civil society and
independent judges would only grow, and that states that resisted
these developments would find themselves under overwhelming
pressure from the rest of the world. However, in the last decade,
countries such as Russia and Venezuela (and to a lesser extent
Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Peru) revived the authoritarian state. In
addition, South Africa's democracy seems on less stable footing, and
countries such as Zimbabwe have engaged in massive human rights
violations with only limited international repercussions. The so-called

77.

See generally IOFFE, supra note 37.
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colored revolutions of the mid-2000s in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and the
Ukraine ended up disappointing their admirers. 78 Even more
significantly, the one great power that has not embraced political
pluralism and tolerates only limited forms of civil liberty, the People's
Republic of China, accumulated considerable economic might during
this period. These developments make faith in the inevitable
ascendency of civil institutions and a rule of law administered by
judges problematic. What seemed inevitable in 2000 looks far more
contingent and uncertain today.
Consider in particular a world where China's influence and
sphere of interests continues to grow. China's ability to resist foreign
pressure, including that of international tribunals and foreign courts,
may become greater than that of other states that have resisted
privatization of international law enforcement. Her power to retaliate,
whether economically or otherwise, might deter other states from
acting against her interests and might encourage them to thwart
international tribunals that might sanction China.
In such a world, jus cogens might end up playing the role that the
Soviet bloc once imagined, namely as a means for one great power to
avoid inconvenient international obligations. Rather than bolstering
the growth of protection of persons against states, it could serve strong
states that wish to avoid outside supervision on how they treat their
subjects. It might once again posit inalienable state interests in
sovereign independence, non-interference in domestic affairs, and
sovereign equality, which in turn would trump claims of the
international order of states.
Chinese jurists have moved in this direction already.7 9 Their
reliance on the doctrine, which can deflect, inter alia, claims that it
owes the international community an accounting for its human rights
practices, might grow. As China's power and influence increases,
partially due to its wealth, partly due to attraction as a successful
model of development, other states might come to its side. The United
States and Europe, deeply dependent on their economic ties with
China, might temper their criticism. Among other things, China's
representatives plausibly could argue that their understanding of jus

The ultimate outcome of the wave of change now rolling over the Arab world
78.
is, to say the least, uncertain. One hopes that these developments will constitute a new
1989, when Central and Eastern Europe threw off Soviet hegemony and local
authoritarianism, but fears that they will turn into a new 1979, when the Iranian
Revolution threw out a secular authoritarian regime and replace it with an even more
pernicious system.
See Li Haopei, Jus Cogens and InternationalLaw, 1982 Y.B. INT'L L. CHINA
79.
37 (1982), translatedin INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD: ESSAYS IN

MEMORY OF LI HAOPEI 499 (Sienho Yee & Wang Tieya eds., 2001); Wang Tieya,
International Law in China: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, 221 RECUEIL
DES COURS 195, 279-87 (1990).
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cogens reflects the VCLT somewhat better than does the modern,
sword vision.
A strong position on the shield vision of jus cogens might not be
confined to human rights, of course. One can imagine a world in which
China rejects portions of international economic law (say the IMF
rules on currency manipulation, or the WTO's rules regarding
protection of trade-related intellectual property) as improperly
interfering with core sovereignty values.80 The jus cogens shield does
not exclude any of these possibilities.
This, of course, is not the only scenario for the future of jus cogens.
China might come to see the value of Western conceptions of human
rights and economic freedom, either because its people demand
decency and liberty, because Western states engage in a socialization
process that persuades China of the value of these rights, or because
China chooses to confront the West over other issues instead. My point
is only that the jus cogens concept contains the possibility of multiple
functions, not all of which have the benign effects of the vision
currently in fashion in some circles in Europe and the United States.

80.
Less this seem far-fetched, one should recall that reputable scholars
consider much of international investment law to constitute an illegitimate
infringement of sovereign interests. E.g., MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 143 (3d ed. 2010) ("[It] is incorrect to
speak in terms of a well-established law on foreign investment that is universally
accepted, though the tendency in the law has been to speak in terms of such certainty.");
id. at 235 ("[T]he law will return to the same state of normlessness that prevailed prior
to the making of investment treaties."). Adding a jus cogens frosting to this cake would
not constitute such a great leap. Id. at 469-73 (discussing exceptions to investment
treaty obligations based on jus cogens arguments). One also should note China's
absolute position on sovereign immunity, which brooks no exceptions. In a recent case in
the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, the government submitted the following
statement:
The consistent and principled position of China is that a state and its property
shall, in foreign courts, enjoy absolute immunity, including absolute immunity
from jurisdiction and from execution, and has never applied the so-called
principle or theory of "restrictive immunity." The courts in China have no
jurisdiction over, nor in practice have they ever entertained, any case in which a
foreign state or government is sued as a defendant or any claim involving the
property of any foreign state or government, irrespective of the nature or
purpose of the relevant act of the foreign state or government and also
irrespective of the nature, purpose or use of the relevant property of the foreign
state or government. At the same time, China has never accepted any foreign
courts having jurisdiction over cases in which the State or Government of China
is sued as a defendant, or over cases involving the property of the State or
Government of China. This principled position held by the Government of China
is unequivocal and consistent.
Democratic Republic of the Congo v. FG Hemisphere Assocs. LLC, [2011] H.K.C.F.A.R.
41, $ 197 (C.F.A.) (H.K.).
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IV. CONCLUSION

Jus cogens came into the international legal system as a result of
two profoundly different traditions. On the one hand, jurists for
centuries have tried to bring normative constraints into the system,
relying either on religious convictions or moral reasoning. On the other
hand, during the postwar period one side of the superpower divide, the
Soviet bloc, sought recognition of a mechanism that gave it a veto over
international legal obligations. The VCLT brokered a compromise
between these traditions, but on a whole gave more to the Soviet side
than to the moralists.
The VCLT position seemed to understand jus cogens as a shield
protecting states against the demands of the international legal
system. Only with the transformation of the international system
following the end of the Cold War did an alternative vision become
popular, one that saw in jus cogens a means for imposing duties on
states and corresponding rights in the international order. With the
dispute between Germany and Italy, the ICJ now has an opportunity
to contribute to our understanding of what jus cogens does today.
The ICJ could determine that Italy has a privilege, but not a duty,
to carve out an exception from the customary international law of
foreign sovereign immunity. At least some advocates, however, might
then argue that the recognition of a privilege suggests a duty: if a state
has the capacity under international law to impose liability on foreign
states for jus cogens violations, what arguments can justify not
exercising this authority? Thus, embracing the shield might sow the
ground for wielding the sword.
Other states, however, might view any decision by the ICJ
tolerating suits against foreign sovereigns as itself a violation of the
jus cogens norms of sovereign equality, noninterference in domestic
affairs, and sovereign independence. If jus cogens shields states from
the international order, then surely its protection should extend to
agents of the order such as the ICJ. We might then witness a kind of
dialectic, in which an articulation of one view of jus cogens drives
influential international actors toward a stronger embrace of a
radically different vision. The new synthesis would depend on the

correlation of forces engaged. The result would not necessarily be a
strengthening of international protection of human rights.
However the ICJ resolves the case and whatever it happens to say
about jus cogens, we must acknowledge that within the concept lies
distinct visions with significantly divergent functional consequences.
Further development of the sword conception has the potential to
enhance the authority of civil society and disinterested judges to
defend social ends against a selfish or abusive state. But the same
doctrine, understood as a shield, might expand the power of individual
states to resist the demands of the international order. As the old
proverb says, we must be very careful about what we wish for.

